

Message Text

SECRET

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64

ACTION EUR-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00 PM-03 MBFR-02

ACDA-10 GAC-01 SAL-01 STR-01 EB-03 CIAE-00 INR-09

NSAE-00 RSC-01 OMB-01 L-02 T-03 PA-02 PRS-01 IO-03

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R 131738 Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3849
INFO AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
USMISSION BERLIN
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T BONN 3733

LIMDIS NOFORN

E. O. 11652: X- GDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, GW, US
SUBJ: CSCE AND INNER- GERMAN RELATIONS

HELSINKI FOR MPT DEL; VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL

SUMMARY: WE HAVE LEARNED THAT WITH THE PERSONAL
INTERVENTION OF MINISTER SCHEEL, THE FONOFF HAS
RESISTED A PROPOSAL BY SPECIAL MINISTER BAHR AND
CHACELLERY OFFICIALS THAT THE FRG AGREE TO SIGNIFICANT
CONCESSIONS TO THE SOVIETS AT CSCE IN RETURN FOR SOVIET
PRESSURES ON THE GDR TO ADOPT MORE FLEXIBLE POSITIONS
IN THE INNER- GERMAN TALKS. AS WE ARE TOLD, BAHR
PROPOSED THAT FRG GOALS IN CSCE BE SUBORDINATED TO THE
" HIGHER PRIORITY" INNER- GERMAN RELATIONSHIP.

END SUMMARY.

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1. OUR SOURCE SAID BAHR' S POSITION APPEARED TO BE THE PRODUCT OF THE TOUGH POSITIONS ADVANCED SO FAR BY KOHL IN THE RESUMED INNER- GERMAN DIALOGUE, AND OF THE STRONG PRESSURE FOR FRG CONCESSIONS AT CSCE EXERTED ON FRG AMB SAHM IN MOSCOW BY BONDARENKO AND ON BAHR BY SOVIET AMB FALIN IN BONN. WE ARE TOLD THAT IN DEFENDING HIS PROPOSAL, BAHR ALSO CONTENDED THAT WEST GERMAN GOALS AT CSCE CONCERNING FREER MOVEMENT WOULD IN ANY EVENT BE UNREALISTIC " SINCE THE U. S. IS NOT PREPARED TO PUSH THE RUSSIANS HARD ENOUGH" AT HELSINKI ON CSCE SUBJECTS.
 2. WE UNDERSTAND THAT, IN RESISITING THE PROPOSAL TO SUBORDINATE FRG GOALS AT CSCE TO THE INNER- GERMAN RELATIONSHIP, SCHEEL ARGUED (WITH THE STRONG AID OF AMB BRUNNER) THAT THE TWO SETS OF GOALS SHOULD BE PERCEIVED IN A COMPLEMENTARY RATHER THAN CONFLICTING FASHION. MANDATES WOULD HAVE TO BE STREAMLINED, THE FRG COULD IN DUE TIME AGREE TO CONCESSIONS ON NON- ESSENTIAL ITEMS AND GERMAN REPS COULD EVEN DISSIMULATE AND TELL THE RUSSIANS THEY WOULD (UNSUCCESSFULLY) SUPPORT CERTAIN POSITIONS WITHIN NATO. BUT OUR SOURCE SAID SCHEEL ARGUED THAT CERTAIN SECURITY, FREER MOVEMENT AND POST- CSCE ISSUES COULD NOT BE COMPROMISED, AND IN FACT CSCE HUMAN CONTACT PROPOSALS GENERALLY REINFORCED BONN' S GOALS IN THE INNER- GERMAN DIALOGUE. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE ARE TOLD THAT THE FRG IS INCLINED TO PLACE GREATEST WEIGHT IN CSCE BASKET THREE ON WORKING CONDITIONS FOR JOURNALISTS AND ON FAMILY REUNIFICATION, MARRIAGES, VISITS, ETC; SHOULD SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS ON EXIT PERMITS FOR TRAVEL AND REGARDING ACCESS TO FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC/ CONSULAR ESTABLISHMENTS PER SE NOT BE POSSIBLE, THE FRG WOULD INSIST AT LEAST ON EXIT PERMITS AND ON ACCESS TO FOREIGN ESTABLISHMENTS AS NECESSARY TO FACILITATE FAMILY REUNIFICATION, MARRIAGES, VISITS, ETC.
 3. IN CLOSING, OUR SOURCE RECALLED THAT BRUNNER HAD INQUIRED OF EMBASSY AND DEPT OFFICIALS CONCERNING WHAT THE U. S. WANTED TO COME OUT OF CSCE. OUR SOURCE SAID HE COULD STATE THE MAIN GOAL WHICH THE FRG DESIRED FROM CSCE, AS SCHEEL SURELY WOULD ADDRESS THIS MATTER IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT AT THE MINISTER' S CONFERENCE. THE FRG HOPED CSCE AND FUTURE
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EAST- WEST CONTACTS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A SITUATION WHERE GERMANY COULD ONE DAY BE REUNIFIED, AND NOTHING MUST BE DONE AT CSCE WHICH COULD CAST DOUBT ON FRG GOALS IN THE AUGUST 1970 LETTER OF GERMAN UNITY. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE FRG (AND SCHEEL IN PARTICULAR) IS ACCORDING GREAT CARE TO THE FORMULATION OF PRINCIPLES ON FRONTIERS AND SELF- DETERMINATION, AND WHY THE FRG ALSO FAVORS PREAMBULATORY LANGUAGE IN THE CSCE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES HOLDING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF PEACEFUL CHANGE OF BORDERS.

4. SCHEEL WILL ALERT THE SOVIETS BEFORE THE CSCE MINISTERS' CONFERENCE THAT HE INTENDS TO MAKE THESE POINTS AND MAY MAKE SUCH A PRESENTATION AT THE MARCH 16 QUARTERLY EC FOREIGN MINISTERS POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS. OUR SOURCE SAID THE FRG ALSO HOPED A POSITIVE REFERENCE TO THE GERMAN QUESTION WOULD FIND ITS WAY INTO THE SECRETARY' S OPENING STATEMENT AT HELSINKI.
HILLENBRAND

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